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A B S T R A C T   
Extant research on the control of IS development projects is largely oriented around control choices and en-
actments from the perspective of managers, thereby neglecting employees’ legitimacy perceptions. Little is 
known about how such perceptions affect employees’ intentions to comply with controls. To address this 
shortcoming, we conducted a factorial survey with 258 IS developers nested in 19 organizations. Our multilevel 
analysis shows that all four considered legitimacy dimensions are primarily a function of control mode and style, 
and to a lesser extent of control degree. Moreover, legitimacy operating on fairness and autonomy is an 
important lever for increasing compliance intentions.   
1. Introduction 
Though people enjoy exercising control over others, hardly anyone 
wants to be controlled. Among other things, this is because control limits 
the controlled person’s autonomy and might be interpreted as a sign of 
distrust [24, 83]. In the organizations concerned with software devel-
opment, managers control the non-routine and complex work of their 
subordinates in order to increase chances for the successful imple-
mentation of IS development (ISD) projects [48, 96]. For example, to 
guide team members, managers may specify the ISD methodology to be 
used and may define testing procedures. However, these and other 
controls do not consistently resolve the high percentage of failed or 
challenged ISD projects [44]. This suggests that, so far, control has not 
been able to serve its purpose of ensuring project success. As a result, 
researchers and practitioners keep trying to identify the underlying 
causes of ineffective controls in ISD projects. 
Previous research on IS control is strongly focused on the manager’s 
(controller’s) choice of control modes to be implemented in such projects 
(e.g., [46, 47, 56]). Related to control choices, a controller can also 
choose among different control frequencies and intensities (control de-
gree, [29]). While the selection of appropriate control modes is certainly 
important, this limited focus not only neglects the different degrees and 
ways controls can be enacted but also ignores the controllee’s 
perspective on those measures [77]. Whether control is enacted unilat-
erally or bilaterally (control style, [96]) can further dictate how an 
employee responds to the control. In other words, the typical research 
focus on control mode choice from the controller’s perspective is 
problematic because it falls short of taking into account how 
controller-induced controls are received by the controllees, which can 
help explain phenomena such as staff demotivation, resistance behavior, 
workaround use, and turnover intentions [35, 77, 83]. The indirect costs 
resulting from such undesirable behavior can easily outweigh the ben-
efits of controls [24]. 
An emerging factor in IS research is the importance of employees 
viewing controls as legitimate. Control legitimacy refers to the con-
trollees’ perception of whether controls are fair, preserve autonomy, and 
allow for group identification and competence development [7]. 
Although widely employed in the literature on organizational behavior 
and sociology, a recent qualitative study by Cram and Wiener [19] has 
introduced the concept of control legitimacy to the ISD literature and 
explored how controls shape legitimacy perceptions of the controllees. 
While the above study provides important groundwork, it remains un-
clear how the legitimacy perceptions may be impacted by diverse con-
figurations of control modes, degrees, and styles. In addition, the 
strength of the connection between control legitimacy and compliance 
intentions remains uncertain. Gaining adequate clarity on these issues is 
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important to further elucidate the consequences of managerial control 
choices on employees, while also potentially highlighting an important 
driver of employee compliance. 
In response, the objectives of the current study are as follows: 
(a) It focuses specifically on the individual-level controllee perspec-
tives on ISD controls, rather than on controller choices;  
(b) It extends beyond the traditional focus of control modes to 
consider other emerging control concepts; and  
(c) It examines the link between ISD control legitimacy and control 
compliance intentions. 
In order to undertake this line of inquiry, our study is geared toward 
the specific context of ISD projects and addresses the following two 
research questions:  
1 How do different (managerial) control choices and enactments relate 
to employee perceptions of control legitimacy?  
2 Do control legitimacy perceptions increase employee intentions to 
comply with controls? 
In answering these questions, we aim to contribute to IS control 
theory by providing novel insights into the empirical links between focal 
ISD control concepts (control modes, styles, and degrees), control 
legitimacy, and control compliance intentions, which to date have been 
insufficiently considered from a quantitative perspective in prior 
research. On this basis, our research is also expected to yield actionable 
insights for managers wishing to implement IS controls in a way that is 
perceived to be more legitimate, thereby potentially increasing IS de-
velopers’ control compliance and decreasing negative emotional and 
behavioral consequences. 
In order to answer our research questions, we conducted a vignette 
study with 258 Austrian and German IS developers, which allowed us to 
quantitatively assess different constructs of interest. In comparison with 
conventional online surveys that often ask relatively abstract questions, 
we presented IS developers with a set of concrete control situations 
(vignettes) and asked them not only for their personal assessment 
regarding control legitimacy but also for their resulting intentions to 
comply with the controls described. 
This paper is structured as follows: First, we present relevant con-
cepts in the field of IS control and develop our research model and hy-
potheses. Next, we elaborate on our methodological approach and 
present the results of our statistical analyses. We then discuss our find-
ings and conclude the paper with opportunities for further research. 
2. Theoretical background 
Past research on control in an ISD project context primarily focuses 
on three concepts: control modes [13, 46, 47], control degrees [29], and 
control styles [29, 34, 75]. Each concept is oriented around the 
perspective of the manager (i.e., controller), in an attempt to align the 
behavior of the IS project team members with organizational objectives1 
([47], see Table 1). 
2.1. Conceptualization of IS control activities 
The study of control modes has the most extensive history in the IS 
control literature and is framed around four core dimensions: behavior, 
output, clan, and self-control [46, 47, 69]. In essence, control modes 
examine ‘what’ controls are being exercised by a controller [76, 96]. 
Behavior control and output control are commonly grouped as formal 
controls, while clan control and self-control represent informal controls 
[47]. In particular, behavior control means specifying work processes 
and monitoring employee adherence to these processes [46]. Regardless 
of the work process, outcome control tries to reinforce employee be-
haviors by setting desired outcomes, measuring and then rewarding or 
penalizing actual outcomes [69]. Clan control as an informal control 
mode tries to foster the creation of shared norms and values to establish 
“acceptable” behaviors [40, 68]. Finally, self-control builds on intrin-
sically motivated self-management of controllees who set their own 
goals along with the behaviors to achieve these goals [32, 47]. See 
Table 1 for additional details. 
Control modes are a good starting point to conceptualize different 
types of managerial controls that can be implemented in an ISD setting. 
However, focusing merely on modes neglects the fact that the same 
control can be implemented in various ways. For instance, team events 
(clan control) could be implemented bi-weekly with mandatory atten-
dance or monthly with voluntary attendance. To achieve this end, 
control degree - a control concept that has more recently emerged within 
the literature - considers the quantity and intensity of controls in place 
[29]. A small number of less frequent and low-intensity controls de-
scribes a relaxed degree, whereas a large number of more frequent, 
Table 1 
Overview of Control Modes, Degrees, and Styles  
Concept Dimensions Definition Examples References 
Control 
modes 
Behavior control Managers overseeing the specific process steps that 
subordinate employees take. 
A project manager requires a project team to employ a waterfall 
development methodology. 
[13, 46, 47, 
67] 
Output control Managers monitoring the specific outputs of subordinate 
employees. 
A project manager requires each developer to complete the 
coding tasks assigned to them each week. 
Self-control Managers granting subordinate employees autonomy to 
make independent decisions on their own activities. 
A project manager permits a developer to independently 
determine the extent of testing that is required for the code that 
she or he develops. 
Clan control Managers facilitating the development of shared norms 
and beliefs that guide the behavior of subordinate 
employees. 
A project manager arranges for a shared team lunch every week to 
build team spirit and shared perspectives among team members. 
Control 
degrees 
Relaxed A small number of low-intensity controls are 
simultaneously in place. 
A project manager requires informal updates from project team 
members during the monthly status meeting. 
[29] 
Tight A large number of high-intensity controls are 
simultaneously in place 
A project manager requires detailed, daily memos on the status of 
a project, alongside updated timing and cost projections. 
Control 
styles 
Unilateral 
(authoritative) 
Controllee behavior is influenced through bureaucracy 
and top-down commands. 
A project manager unilaterally decides whether an agile 
development methodology will be applied to a project. 
[1, 29, 34, 
96] 
Bilateral 
(Enabling) 
Controllee behavior is influenced through close and 
frequent interactions between the controller and the 
controllee. 
A project manager implements an agile development 
methodology on a project based on several discussions with 
project team members.  
1 At this point, we want to remark that our study is not limited to controls 
which try to mitigate typical agency concerns (such as information asymmetries 
and goal conflicts). In line with recent findings of Wiener et al. [97], our study 
also covers controls that are related to stewardship theory (e.g., controls tar-
geted at maximizing value creation by enabling cooperation and coordination) 
[10, 97]. 
R. Walser et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Information & Management 58 (2021) 103522
3
high-intensity controls represent a tight degree. 
Similarly, different controls selected by a supervisor might be 
enacted in different ways. This aspect is represented by the third control 
concept: control style [29, 96]. Two dimensions of control style have 
been identified in the literature. A unilateral style (also referred to as an 
authoritative style) describes a top-down management approach where 
the controllee exerts little influence on the design or implementation of 
the controls; that is, under a unilateral style, there is little room for 
deviation in how the controls are designed and assessed. In contrast, a 
bilateral style (also referred to as an enabling style) increasingly relies 
on controllee feedback, and controllees are provided with a rationale to 
aid in their understanding of enacted controls. 
2.2. Control legitimacy 
It is only relatively recently that researchers have started shifting 
their focus away from the controller perspective (i.e., selecting and 
enacting a suitable set of controls) to increasingly consider the con-
trollee perspective. Part of this recent shift builds on the concept of 
control legitimacy, which originates from institutional theory and con-
siders how norms and routines guide social behavior and order within 
organizations [60]. Legitimacy in management theory refers to the 
perception that the actions of an authority are desirable, appropriate, 
proper, and just [88]. Legitimacy is not only a relevant subject in the 
field of management [7], but is also discussed in other disciplines such as 
political science [83], philosophy [53], psychology [93], and sociology 
[43]. Perceptions of legitimacy can be constructed through individual 
and collective cognition [89]. Past commentators have recognized the 
importance of legitimacy in exerting influence, building trust, and 
convincing subordinates that a decision is ‘correct’ [9]. Indeed, some 
organizational theorists have argued that organizational survival and 
success depend on legitimacy (e.g. [60]). 
When applied to the context of managerial control, legitimacy stems 
from both the individual and collective assessments of controls [8]. This 
infers that employees do not automatically assume that controls 
implemented by their managers are always appropriate and just, but 
that employees make individual judgments about a control based on 
their beliefs [9]. Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa [7] suggested that legiti-
macy perceptions stem from several sources, namely fairness and justice, 
autonomy, group identification, and competence development. Those 
four sources were later considered by Cram and Wiener [19] and rep-
resented the conceptual focus of the current study (see Table 2). 
2.3. Control compliance 
Although the IS control literature has intensively investigated the 
factors considered by managers in the selection and enactment of con-
trols, as well as the characteristics of the controls themselves, relatively 
little attention, has been accorded to compliance with controls within an 
ISD project context [16]. This is surprising because many controls used 
in an IS-related organizational setting are of a ‘manual’ nature; that is, 
they require the active conformity of employees. For instance, behavior 
control would encourage employees to follow prescribed procedures, 
although they could decide to not comply with the guidance. We expect 
that subordinates experiencing negative socio-emotional side effects 
from such prescriptions—such as demotivation, disengagement, demo-
tivation, frustration, or mistrust [16, 90]—would be less willing to 
comply with the respective controls. Other areas of IS research, such as 
information security, have a much more extensive tradition of exam-
ining employee compliance with controls [33, 61]. For instance, the 
information security body of knowledge incorporates various theories, 
including deterrence theory [86, 91], the theory of reasoned action [6], 
and protection motivation theory [5, 71]. Corresponding studies, such 
as Son et al. [86], find a relationship between perceived legitimacy and 
employee compliance with IS security policies. In the same vein, Bauer 
and Bernroider [6] observed that personal moral justification is related 
to IS security policy compliance and emphasizes that the importance of 
IS controls be perceived as reasonable and fair. 
Despite the general lack of focus in the existing IS literature on 
compliance with project-related controls, several earlier studies have 
recognized the importance and relevance of the topic to managers. For 
example, where controls are appropriately adhered to during a project, 
organizations recognize the attainment of increases in efficiency, pro-
cess compliance, and quality [28, 42, 50]. Since the achievement of 
these objectives is of key importance in facilitating a successful project, 
our study seeks to further our understanding of how control choices (in 
terms of control modes and degree) and enactments (in terms of control 
style) are related to control legitimacy, and ultimately to employees’ 
intention to comply with enacted controls. For example, it remains un-
clear whether a bilateral control style (compared to a unilateral one) or a 
relaxed control degree (compared to a tight one) has a stronger impact 
on legitimacy perceptions and how this translates into compliance 
intentions. 
2.4. Summary of related work 
In consideration of the preceding sections, we carefully examined 
focal IS control studies addressing IS control activities, control legiti-
macy, and control compliance, as a tool to verify the existing patterns 
and opportunities for research that we identified (see Appendix A). 
Besides the general context of each study, the Appendix makes note of 
the orientation of the studies as being controller- or controllee-centric, 
as well as the variables and relationships of interest (e.g., control 
modes, project performance, etc.). Of the ten studies listed, only one 
study adopted an exclusively controllee-centric perspective [19], while 
two studies [32, 34] considered the perspective of both controllers and 
controllees. In regard to the variables and relationships of interest, 
control modes (including formal and/or informal control) were exam-
ined in nine of the ten studies, while only three studies [19, 29, 34] 
considered additional control concepts, such as degree or style. Several 
studies (e.g., [13, 49, 81]) focused on the antecedents of control choices, 
though performance is the dependent variable in two studies [28, 32]. 
Although one study focused on control legitimacy [19], none considered 
control compliance. Therefore, the research gap that we focus on in this 
study pertains to the controllee-centric perspective that transcends a 
primary reliance on control modes to consider other control concepts (i. 
e., degree, style), while considering both control legitimacy and control 
compliance as dependent variables. We outline in the following section 
how we approached this research. 
3. Research model and hypotheses 
Based on the three dominant IS control concepts (i.e., modes, de-
grees, styles), as well as the concepts of control legitimacy (involving the 
Table 2 
Sources of Legitimacy  
Source Definition 
Fairness The extent that control activities are perceived as being just and reasonable. 
Autonomy The extent that control activities are perceived as recognizing the importance of flexibility, independence, individuality, and trust. 
Group identification The extent that control activities are perceived as enabling cooperation in and belonging to the team, as well as participation in decision-making. 
Competence development The extent that control activities are perceived as facilitating knowledge and skills development.  
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four sources fairness, autonomy, competence development, and group 
identification) and compliance with IS controls, we propose a set of four 
hypotheses to be empirically evaluated. The resulting research model is 
outlined in Figure 1. 
3.1. Control Choices/Enactments and control legitimacy perceptions 
(RQ1) 
Prior research has shown that several factors impact a manager’s 
control choices, such as the measurability of project outcomes, observ-
ability of controllee behavior, and the controller’s technical knowledge 
[46, 49]. The resulting effects of the chosen control modes are then 
typically measured based on performance dimensions of specific ISD 
projects, such as project cost or quality [75]. This approach sometimes 
results in inconclusive or contradictory findings, suggesting that (in) 
formal control can either be performance-enhancing, neutral, or even 
detrimental to performance [19, 75]. While high outcome observability 
suggests the use of (formal) outcome control by managers, we argue that 
the above-mentioned factors should not be the only decision criteria for 
choosing control modes. Instead, managers should also consider 
whether and how the chosen control modes can be expected to affect 
controllees’ legitimacy perceptions. 
There is empirical evidence that the use of informal control increases 
employee satisfaction [75]. This is because informal controls (such as 
the promotion of self-management and cultivating shared team values) 
are perceived as fair [88] and autonomy preserving [57]. These views 
are likely to originate, at least in part, from the flexibility and the lack of 
strict prescriptions that characterize informal controls. That is, there is a 
degree of trust that is imparted on controllees who receive clan and 
self-control, which is not present with formal control options. The col-
lective norms that are derived from informal controls (particularly clan 
control) are likely to also positively contribute to the advancement of 
group identification by virtue of the shared experiences of the team 
members [15]. Extending this logic, because of the inflexibility of formal 
controls, they are likely to be perceived as restricting and hindering 
personal development, whereas one would expect that perceptions of 
competence development would be heightened in cases where informal 
controls are used, so as to maximize experimentation and personal 
growth [26]. Therefore, under consideration of the four sources of 
control legitimacy (i.e., fairness, autonomy, competence development, 
group identification), we hypothesize that: 
H1: The use of informal controls (i.e., clan, self) is associated with higher 
employee perceptions of control legitimacy (in terms of perceived fairness, 
autonomy, group identification, and competence development) in comparison 
to the use of formal controls (i.e., behavior, outcome). 
As Höffe [35] observed in a political context, controls limit freedom 
of action, which is usually a disadvantage for the affected persons. In our 
context of ISD projects, implementing controls with high intensity and 
frequency (i.e., a tight control degree) might be perceived by employees 
as excessively constraining and inconvenient, thereby restricting fair-
ness and autonomy. Moreover, controllees who have to spend more time 
complying with tight controls would likely have less time to interact 
with their colleagues on the project and ‘learn by doing’, thereby 
restricting group identification and competence development. Conse-
quently, the use of a tight control degree in ISD projects is likely to 
reduce overall legitimacy perceptions of controllees, relative to the use 
of a (more) relaxed control degree. For example, case study findings by 
Cram and Wiener [19] suggest that in situations where the control de-
gree is tight, employees generally find controls less legitimate in com-
parison with situations employing relaxed controls. Similarly, Rustagi 
et al. [81] find that tight controls are associated with a lower level of 
trust, which could result in the perception that controls are inappro-
priate and thus unfair. Moreover, a tight control degree has shown to 
deteriorate shared understanding among controllees [29], potentially 
impeding identification with the group. Taken together, there is evi-
dence supporting the view that employees perceiving controls as 
providing some level of independence from controllers (due to a relaxed 
control degree) will relate to higher perceptions of control legitimacy. In 
contrast, we expect controls hampering the ability of employees in terms 
of independently doing their work (due to a tight degree) will lead to 
lower legitimacy perceptions (ceteris paribus). We thus hypothesize 
that: 
H2: The use of a relaxed control degree is associated with higher employee 
perceptions of control legitimacy (in terms of perceived fairness, autonomy, 
group identification, and competence development) in comparison to the use 
of a tight control degree. 
Furthermore, we expect that enacting controls in a unilateral 
(authoritative) style will be perceived as illegitimate by the affected 
employees. If a manager decides to enact controls using a top-down 
approach without clearly communicating the controls and the under-
lying control objectives, the employees might lack a rationale for the 
enacted controls and the opportunity to provide feedback [63, 96]. 
Indeed, the key features that characterize a bilateral (enabling) control 
style—repair and transparency—are likely to play a key role here. 
Repair concerns the controller’s collection and appreciation of con-
trollee feedback, while transparency refers to controllers providing 
controllees with a clear understanding and rationale of enacted controls, 
as well as with feedback on their performance [1, 96]. We expect that 
the encouragement of individual and team feedback on controls (i.e., 
repair) will contribute to higher perceptions of autonomy and group 
identification. Likewise, where controllees have a clear understanding of 
the controls and receive performance feedback (i.e., transparency), 
improved perceptions of fairness and competence development will 
result. 
For example, Chua and Myers [38] consider the importance of this 
negotiation between the controller and controllee in shaping the social 
and organizational structure of controls. Similarly, Hsu et al. [36] note 
the importance of employee involvement in the formation of IS controls 
(in this case, information security policies), which are in turn signifi-
cantly related to policy compliance. Therefore, when controllees 
participate in such bilateral interactions, they are more likely to influ-
ence and contribute to the design and implementation of controls that 
Fig. 1. Research Model  
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they then regard as increasingly fair, autonomy-preserving, helpful for 
their competence development, thereby promoting their identification 
with the group. This is also in line with the results of early qualitative 
studies [19, 29], which offer preliminary evidence that a bilateral con-
trol style results in higher legitimacy perceptions. Consequently, we 
hypothesize that: 
H3: The use of a bilateral control style is associated with higher employee 
perceptions of control legitimacy (in terms of perceived fairness, autonomy, 
group identification, and competence development) in comparison to the use 
of a unilateral control style. 
3.2. Control legitimacy perceptions and compliance intentions (RQ2) 
Based on the relationships proposed above, we now turn our atten-
tion to the link between employees’ legitimacy perceptions of ISD 
project controls and their compliance intentions. From the perspective 
of fairness, past research in cybersecurity and management examines the 
judgment of employees regarding the morality and justness of their or-
ganization’s rules. In this body of work, the results show a positive 
relationship between an employee’s perception that control is fair and 
their intention to comply with that control, or a negative relationship 
with their intention to violate the control [6, 74, 86, 94]. For example, 
Posey et al. [74] frame privacy invasions as an aspect of legitimacy and 
examine them in relation to procedural justice and non-compliance with 
information security policies. 
Similarly, autonomy has been found to be an important driver of IS 
developers’ ongoing organizational commitment and quality of work in 
the context of platform control and governance [4]. Where there is a 
mismatch between a manager’s and an employee’s control perception 
(legitimate vs. illegitimate), alienation and anti-organizational behavior 
may result [20, 63]. For instance, Chua and Myers [38] emphasized that 
the enactment of controls comes with a potential cost in terms of time 
investments (e.g., frequent controller-controllee interactions) and can 
be misinterpreted by controllees. Since ISD projects are often charac-
terized by considerable time pressure, controllers may seek to employ an 
increasingly authoritative control style, which controllees may perceive 
as a lack of trust and reduction of their autonomy. This could lead to 
employees who are inclined to resist the following control or to pursue a 
workaround [95, 98]. 
Specific to group identification, past legitimacy research has high-
lighted the links between managerial control and team commitment (e. 
g., [64]). Wiener et al. [96] reported that committed and motivated 
employees will be less inclined to resist controls so that implementing 
legitimate controls might be a good opportunity to increase the overall 
commitment and motivation of employees. Finally, in regard to 
competence development, where employees believe that they are being 
provided with opportunities to learn and improve, past research in-
dicates that they are increasingly committed to organizational goals and 
will apply effort to aid in their achievement [7]. Based on the above 
considerations, we hypothesize that: 
H4: Perceptions of control legitimacy (in terms of perceived fairness, 
autonomy, group identification, and competence development) positively 
influence an employee’s intentions to comply with ISD project controls. 
4. Methodology 
We conducted factorial surveys to test our hypotheses. Factorial 
surveys (also referred to as vignette studies) were introduced by Rossi 
and Anderson [79] and are powerful methods to understand the prin-
ciples behind human judgments. Put simply, factorial surveys apply 
experimental design in (online) survey research, trying to maximize 
internal and external validity by combining the advantages of both 
qualitative and quantitative research [79]. For this purpose, a set of 
short descriptions of fictitious scenarios (i.e., vignettes) is formulated 
and presented to survey respondents. Those vignettes should be realistic 
and contain independent variables, which are then systematically 
manipulated and combined [3]. The resulting vignette universe’s size (i. 
e., the total number of unique vignettes) equals the cartesian product of 
the included variables and all levels of these variables. After the pre-
sentation of each vignette, survey respondents are asked for their as-
sessments, typically using Likert scales. In the end, statistical analysis of 
the resulting dataset allows conclusions to be drawn on the relationships 
between different independent and the dependent variables under 
investigation. Factorial surveys include various explanatory and 
contextual factors, which makes them a powerful tool for investigating 
causalities of respondent judgments. Moreover, as vignettes try to 
describe real-world scenarios, they are often more realistic and tangible 
to respondents as compared to conventional surveys [3]. 
For our study, we presented the survey respondents with various 
control situations in a fictitious ISD project setting with varying control 
modes, degrees, and styles. We then asked the participants for their 
assessments regarding the four dimensions of control legitimacy (i.e., 
fairness, allowance for autonomy, group identification, competence 
development), as well as their intentions to comply with the presented 
controls. Based on empirical findings in the field of cybersecurity, 
compliance intentions can be seen as a good predictor (β=0.63 to 0.78) 
of actual compliance behavior [70, 85]. Similarly, Cram et al. [17] re-
ported that the relationships between their defined antecedent cate-
gories with actual versus intended information security policy 
compliance were, in most cases, not significantly different. Moreover, 
asking our survey respondents indirectly about their understanding of 
the vignette protagonist’s compliance behavior is likely to reduce 
so-called social desirability bias [25]. 
4.1. Vignette preparation, validation, and partitioning 
In total, we developed 16 different vignettes for the online study and 
included and manipulated three independent variables: control mode, 
control degree, and control style. To test our research model, we 
formulated one ISD project situation depicting each control mode (i.e., 
behavior, outcome, clan, and self-control) and for each of those four 
modes we varied the control degree (tight vs. relaxed) and style (uni-
lateral vs. bilateral), resulting in 16 unique combinations (see 
Appendix B). After the presentation of each vignette, we asked the 
participants about their control legitimacy perception (regarding all 
four dimensions) and their level of agreement with—i.e., ‘empathy’ 
for—the protagonist’s non-compliance with the presented control (on a 
seven-point Likert scale), as shown in Appendix C. 
The vignette technique requires scenario descriptions that are real-
istic, complete, and clear to the survey respondents [80]. To ensure the 
‘effective’ representation of the different control modes, degrees, and 
styles, we tested the vignettes in two evaluations with a total of 40 
graduate students majoring in IS. After giving the first group of 20 stu-
dents a short introduction to the topic, we presented each student with a 
subset of four vignettes. We asked them to what extent they recognized 
the intended control mode, degree, and style, using a five-point Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (excellent match) to 5 (bad match). To test our 
vignettes and their manipulations, each vignette was assessed by four to 
six students and arithmetic means were calculated. Out of the 48 mean 
values (16 vignettes with 3 assessments each), only six values were 
higher than 3; that is, 42 means were below three, indicating a good 
level of face validity. The first round of evaluation led to minor adap-
tions of three vignettes. For instance, the control degree of one vignette 
was not perceived as tight (but rather relaxed). In this case, we adjusted 
the wording of the description of the control situation associated with 
this vignette by further emphasizing the ‘tightness’ (i.e., high control 
frequency) of the presented controls. To assess the completeness of our 
vignettes, we included open text fields in which the participants could 
add relevant information. The collected information led to an extension 
of the vignette background information that was shown at the beginning 
of each vignette. After revisiting the vignettes, we performed a second 
evaluation round with another 20 graduate students. The evaluation 
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results indicated a further increase in face validity, with 44 out of 48 
means being below 3. 
To assess the students’ interrater agreement, we calculated Kendall’s 
coefficient of concordance [45] for all assessments of control mode, 
degree, and style. Kendall’s coefficient of concordance (also referred to 
as Kendall’s W) is a nonparametric test that is suitable for nominal and 
ordinal data with multiple raters [99]. Similar to Cronbach’s Alpha, the 
resulting value W ranges between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating perfect 
agreement and 0 indicating no agreement. For the first evaluation 
round, the intraclass correlation coefficient was 0.33 (Cronbach’s Alpha: 
0.34, p < .001). Based on the subsequent adaptations, the second 
evaluation with another group of students resulted in a considerably 
higher intraclass correlation coefficient of approximately 0.60 (Cron-
bach’s Alpha: 0.599, p < .001). Considering the nomenclature offered by 
Landis and Koch [51], the relative strength of agreement increased from 
fair to substantial over the two rounds. 
Generally, vignette universes can easily reach hundreds or even 
thousands of vignettes and thus become excessively large and imprac-
tical. Depending on the size of the vignette universe, it is recommended 
to partition the vignettes randomly or systematically [87]. With 16 vi-
gnettes, we decided to split the vignette universe systematically into two 
orthogonal and balanced sets of eight vignettes each, which means that 
all factor levels and pairs of levels occur equally often in the vignette sets 
[87]. This systematic approach aims to reduce confounding effects and is 
recommended for rather small vignette universes [3]. Also, in this study, 
there was no need to eliminate any vignettes, since the number of vi-
gnettes was manageable, and we could not identify implausible 
factor-level combinations. By maximizing the variance of the factor 
levels, while preserving orthogonality and factor balance, we arrived at 
a so-called D-efficient design [22]. D-efficient designs are preferable, as 
they reduce the generalized variance of the parameter estimators. 
4.2. Survey design and implementation 
Before carrying out the main survey, we ran a pilot survey on Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a popular online crowdsourcing platform. 
Awarding the workload of approximately 10 to 15 minutes for 
completed participation with $2.00, 232 US-based respondents were 
acquired. The insights gained from the pilot study allowed us to further 
improve our survey instrument and tweak the usability of our main 
online survey, which was implemented with the survey software Lime-
Survey. For instance, an important insight from the pilot test was that it 
was hard for participants to make the assessments without knowing 
more about the project context (e.g., controls may be perceived as being 
more legitimate in a project suffering from delays than in a project that is 
ahead of schedule). Consequently, we included some general project 
background information that was constantly shown at the beginning of 
each vignette. In particular, without providing any concrete numbers, 
we assumed that the ISD project was of average size and complexity for 
the organization and was recently started and was proceeding according 
to the specified cost, time, and scope plans. Furthermore, to improve the 
survey’s ease of use, we reduced the points on Likert scale from eleven to 
seven points. 
To reduce the time requirement for our survey respondents and to 
avoid fatigue effects, we did not include a manipulation check of the 
control constructs in the final survey. Instead, we carried out manipu-
lation checks in our upstream vignette validation process as described in 
the previous section. Still, to make sure that we included only survey 
respondents who read the vignettes carefully in our study sample, we 
implemented an instructional manipulation check (IMC) at the begin-
ning of our survey, as suggested by Oppenheimer et al. [66]. Put simply, 
an IMC is a sort of trick question. If respondents do not follow the in-
structions provided (enter the words: “understood” into a text box) but 
answer the trick question instead (i.e., select sports activities from a list), 
it can be assumed that they did not process the instructions carefully 
enough and thus should be excluded from the sample. Otherwise, they 
might bias the study results because they are less likely to recognize the 
nuanced differences between various vignettes. Participants failing the 
IMC at the first attempt were encouraged to re-read the instructions 
carefully and to re-answer the question. If they answered the trick 
question incorrectly again, they were excluded from the survey. Placing 
the manipulation check at the beginning of the survey can also help 
increase participant attentiveness in general [66]. In the current survey, 
89 participants failed the IMC. On average, the remaining 258 partici-
pants spent about 22 minutes completing the survey (median: 17 
minutes). 
For the main online survey, we targeted managers of IT-centric or-
ganizations in Austria and Germany with at least 50 employees. We 
briefly explained the study goals and asked managers to forward the 
survey link to in-house IS developers via email. The survey was available 
in English and German, and the participants could freely switch between 
the two languages throughout the survey. As an incentive, we offered 
free access to the study’s results and raffled ten 50 € Amazon vouchers 
among the survey participants (who provided an email address at the 
end of the survey). In total, as indicated above, we collected complete 
survey responses from 258 IS developers working in 19 organizations. 
Most of these organizations were software development companies and 
IS service subsidiaries of banks, insurances, and energy firms. 
4.3. Data and bias analysis 
To minimize any potential cultural bias, we targeted only IS de-
velopers in Austria and Germany, which have similar national culture 
profiles, according to Schwartz’s culture model [84] and data from the 
European Social Survey [78]. Our control variables included gender, 
formal education, work experience, as well as typical development 
methodology and project team size. Due to multicollinearity with work 
experience (VIF >3), we did not include age in the models. Table 3 
provides sociodemographic information on the survey participants. 
As the survey was based on a mono-method research design and a 
self-report instrument, we needed to test for common method variance 
(CMV) [55]. CMV may cause a certain amount of covariance shared 
among all indicators and is increasingly regarded as a potentially serious 
bias in behavioral research [12]. We applied Harman’s single-factor test 
as a diagnostic technique to test for CMV and subjected all of our 
measurement variables to a principal components factor analysis to see 
if either a single factor or a general factor emerges that may account for 
the majority of covariance among measures [73]. The results showed 
that the largest single component did not explain the majority of the 
variance in our data (accounting for only 30.5%). Instead, we found that 
our data consisted of at least four components with eigenvalues >1 and 
that these components collectively explained 68.3% of the total vari-
ance. This suggests that CMV is unlikely to be a serious concern in our 
study. Moreover, we carried out a marker-variable approach for esti-
mating CMV as proposed by Lindell and Whitney [52]. Their approach 
was extended by Malhotra et al. [55] to allow for a more conservative 
CMV assessment. Using the second-lowest positive correlation (which 
was extremely low with a value of 0.025) as a proxy for estimating CMV, 
we calculated the corrected correlations in our model to see whether 
Table 3 
Survey Participants’ Sociodemographic Information (N=258, results in Percent)  
Education Age (years) Work Exp. (years) 
No degree 18.7 18-24 7.2 0-5 26.5 
High School 21.9 25-34 37.3 6-10 21.3 
Undergraduate 22.5 35-44 29.5 11-15 13.2 
Postgraduate 36.1 45-54 23.3 16-19 10.9 
Other 0.8 55+ 3.2 20+ 28.5 
ISD Methodology Gender  
Agile 41.9 Female 11.6   
Waterfall 12.8 Male 84.1   
Hybrid 38.4 No answer 4.3   
Other 7.0      
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they remained significant. All our analyses indicated that the adjusted 
correlations remained significant and that CMV does not seriously harm 
the results. 
As our survey respondents were nested in 19 different organizations, 
we carried out linear mixed models using statistical software SPSS v25 to 
test our hypotheses. Linear mixed models are often also referred to as 
hierarchical linear models or multilevel models, having the same as-
sumptions of linearity, homogeneity of variance, and normally distrib-
uted residuals. Although in our case, the residuals were not normally 
distributed, robust models can likely be created [82]. There is an 
ongoing debate on whether ordinal Likert-scale data can be treated as 
interval data. We only labeled the end points of our Likert scales and 
used seven points (instead of only 3 or 5) without forcing a direction, 
which enabled us to treat our data as interval scaled, using parametric 
tests [65]. Using linear mixed models allowed us to correctly model 
correlated errors that resulted from the different organizations [27]. On 
the first (top) level, we entered organization ID as subject (i.e., the 
random factor). On the second (lower) level, we entered all 
vignette-level variables and the control variables. To make sure that 
mixed models are the right approach for analyzing our data, we calcu-
lated the intraclass correlation (ICC) as outlined by Aguinis et al. [2]. 
With ICCs ranging from approximately .15 to .26, our datasets were 
within the ICC range typically observed in multilevel studies (e.g., [58]). 
We also calculated the design effects to quantify the effect of indepen-
dence violations on standard error estimates [72]. The resulting values 
were >2 (approx. 3-4), confirming the appropriateness of using of mixed 
models to account for our hierarchical data. 
For the post-hoc interaction analysis, we ran four different linear 
mixed models for each control legitimacy perception. For each model, 
organizations again served as clusters (i.e., the random factor). On the 
second level, we applied a full factorial model which included the main 
within-subjects factor effects (i.e., from control modes, degrees, and 
styles) and all their interaction effects (2-way and 3-way). For the post- 
hoc mediation analyses, we used the MLmed (Multilevel Mediation) 
macro for SPSS as provided and described by Rockwood [31]. Analog-
ically to the mixed models, on the first level, we again used organiza-
tions as clusters. All three control concepts were considered as 
independent lower-level predictors (X) of compliance intentions (Y) as 
the outcome variable. We retained only potential mediators in the 
analysis, i.e., the legitimacy dimensions with significant direct effects on 
compliance intentions (fairness and autonomy), and excluded the other 
two dimensions (i.e., group identification and competence develop-
ment) from the multilevel mediation analysis. 
5. Results 
5.1. Control Choices/Enactments and control legitimacy perceptions 
(RQ1) 
During our first analysis, a Chi-Square omnibus test indicated that 
the predictors are significantly improving the predictions of control 
legitimacy perceptions (Likelihood Ratio 734.59, p < 0.001, not re-
ported in the tables). Next, we created linear mixed models to investi-
gate the first three hypotheses. Our analysis revealed that control mode, 
degree, and style are significantly related to our research model’s four 
sources of control legitimacy perceptions (i.e., fairness, autonomy, 
group identification, and competence development) (p < 0.001). Next, 
we presented the results of calculating four different linear mixed 
models for each control legitimacy perception as a dependent variable to 
specifically test H1-3 (see Tables 4 and 5). 
With regard to H1, our findings confirm that the two informal control 
modes (i.e., clan and self-control) were perceived as significantly more 
Table 4 
Results of the Linear Mixed Model Analysis (Fairness & Autonomy), only sig. CV included   
Legitimacy: Fairness Legitimacy: Autonomy  
Est. t Sig. 95% CI Est. t Sig. 95% CI 
Intercept 2.29 11.98 .000 1.90; 2.68 2.53 13.28 .000 2.13; 2.92 
[mode=informal] 1.11 15.45 .000 .97; 1.26 1.41 20.24 .000 1.27; 1.55 
[mode=formal]         
[degree=relaxed] .51 7.12 .000 .37; .66 .58 8.33 .000 .44; .72 
[degree=tight]         
[style=bilateral] 1.31 18.11 .000 1.16; 1.45 .92 13.17 .000 .78; 1.05 
[style=unilateral]         
[method=nonAgile] .38 4.19 .000 .20; .56     
[method=agile]         
[team_size=0-10 p.]     -.23 -2.82 .005 -.40; -.07 
[team_size>10 p.]          
N=2064, AIC=7963.30 N=2064, AIC=7816.69 
Covariance: Residual=2.68 [Sig. .000] Residual=2.50 [Sig. .000] 
[Subject=Organization] Intercept=.53 [Sig. .007] Intercept=.52 [Sig. .007]  
Table 5 
Results of the Linear Mixed Model Analysis (Group Identification & Competence Development), only sig. CV included   
Legitimacy: Group Id. Legitimacy: Comp. Dev.  
Est. t Sig. 95% CI Est. t Sig. 95% CI 
Intercept 2.72 14.68 .000 2.34; 3.10 2.93 12.91 .000 2.46; 3.34 
[mode=informal] .94 13.12 .000 .80; 1.08 .78 11.24 .000 .65; .92 
[mode=formal]         
[degree=relaxed] .48 6.66 .000 .36; .62 .40 5.79 .000 .27; .54 
[degree=tight]         
[style=bilateral] .62 8.64 .000 .48; .76 .59 8.49 .000 .45; .73 
[style=unilateral]         
[work_exp.=0-10 y.] .31 4.06 .000 .17; .47 .15 2.05 .041 .01; .30 
[work_exp.>10 y.]         
[method=nonAgile] .35 3.79 .000 .17; .53 .24 2.63 .009 .06; .41 
[method=agile]          
N=2064, AIC=7905.70 N=2064, AIC=7813.40 
Covariance: Residual=2.63 [Sig. .000] Residual=2.50 [Sig. .000] 
[Subject=Organization] Intercept=.45 [Sig. .008] Intercept=.79 [Sig. .004]  
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legitimate than the two formal control modes (i.e., behavior and 
outcome control) for all four legitimacy dimensions (p < .001), thereby 
supporting H1. In comparison with the other two control variable co-
efficients within each model, informal controls affect legitimacy most in 
terms of perceived autonomy (coefficient of 1.41), group identification 
(.94), and competence development (.78). As we also identified statis-
tically significant positive effects of a relaxed control degree on all four 
control legitimacy perceptions (p < .001), H2 is also supported in our 
study. In relative terms, however, these positive effects are smaller 
within each model in comparison with the aforementioned effects of 
informal controls and also the effects of bilateral controls, which are 
considered next. H3 pertains to the use of the two basic and contrasting 
control styles (unilateral vs. bilateral) and the resulting control legiti-
macy perceptions. Here, our results show that all legitimacy perceptions 
are positively affected by a bilateral style (p < .001). These effects are 
strongest for perceived fairness (coefficient of 1.31) as compared with 
other control variables within models. Overall, control mode seems to be 
the most important predictor of control legitimacy, followed by control 
styles and control degree. Notably, we did not compare parameters from 
different models. Therefore, the above noted numerical differences may 
be statistically insignificant. 
Looking at the control variables, it turned out that survey re-
spondents who were used to working in agile teams found control less 
legitimate regarding fairness, group identification, and competence 
development (p < .01). Regarding autonomy perceptions, control was 
seen as more legitimate by people typically working in larger teams 
consisting of >10 employees. Moreover, employees with less work 
experience (i.e., ≤10 years) tend to perceive control as more legitimate 
(dimensions: group identification and competence development, p <
.01). The remaining control variables, gender, and education (aca-
demics) had no statistically significant impact on any of the four di-
mensions of control legitimacy and were therefore excluded from the 
final model. 
Finally, the estimates of the covariance parameters in Tables 4-5 
reveal a random organization-to-organization variance (p < .01), which 
is less pronounced and significant in comparison with most individual- 
to-individual differences. This suggests that the nesting of employees 
in organizations influences their legitimacy perceptions. Based on our 
available data, we failed to identify the variables at the organizational 
level which caused those differences. 
5.2. Control legitimacy perceptions and compliance intentions (RQ2) 
Table 6 shows the results of the linear mixed model analysis for 
testing H4. The results suggest a positive relationship between some of 
the control legitimacy perceptions and compliance intentions. Specif-
ically, the estimates show that perceived control fairness and autonomy 
significantly (p < .001) and positively affect control compliance in-
tentions. Here, it should be noted that the coefficient for perceived 
control fairness (.30) is about twice as high as the coefficient for 
perceived autonomy (.17). In contrast, neither perceived group identi-
fication nor competence development significantly affects compliance 
intentions (p > .05). In terms of the control variables, only work expe-
rience has a significant impact on compliance intentions. Employees 
with more work experience (>10 years) showed higher compliance in-
tentions (p < .05). Taken together, we find partial support for H4. 
Organization as a random factor, similar to the situation with H1-H3, 
explains a significant proportion of the compliance intentions’ vari-
ability (p < .01). This suggests that the survey respondents’ assessments 
of compliance intentions differed based on the organization they were 
working for. As aforementioned, we could not identify variables at the 
organizational level which caused those differences. 
5.3. Post-hoc analyses 
We ran additional analyses to investigate possible interaction effects 
between control modes, degrees, and styles on control legitimacy per-
ceptions, as well as the mediating effects of such perceptions on 
compliance intentions. Firstly, the four different linear mixed models for 
each control legitimacy perception revealed no significant (2-way or 3- 
way) interaction effects of the three control concepts, while their main 
(base) effects remained significant in each model. 
Secondly, our multilevel mediation results (as shown in Appendix D) 
revealed that control modes, degree, and style have significant direct 
effects (within-organizations) on compliance intentions. These direct 
effects are weaker for control degree (.13, p < .05) compared to control 
mode (.32, p < .001) and style (.39, p < .001). Regarding indirect ef-
fects, it turns out that for all three control concepts under investigation, 
only fairness and autonomy are (partial) mediators for compliance in-
tentions. More precisely, the indirect effects of control mode on 
compliance intentions were approximately .35 (via fairness perceptions, 
p < .001) and .22 (via autonomy perceptions, p < .001). The indirect 
effects of control style were comparably strong with approximately .37 
(via fairness perceptions, p < .001) and .17 (via autonomy perceptions, 
p < .001). For the control degree, the mediation effects of fairness and 
autonomy were considerably weaker while still significant (.16 and .10, 
p < .001). Those findings are in line with the results of the linear mixed 
model analyses. It should be noted that our data did not meet all as-
sumptions for mediation or linear regression analysis. As such, the 
values in Appendix D need to be interpreted with care. 
Finally, as shown in Appendix E, all four dimensions of control 
legitimacy perceptions showed a significant correlation (p < .001), 
which reflects their conceptual closeness with the overarching concept 
of control legitimacy, as introduced by Bijlsma-Frankema and Costa [7]. 
Also, the correlation analysis shows that all four legitimacy dimensions 
are significantly correlated with compliance intentions (p < .001). 
6. Discussion and contributions 
This study aimed to examine how different control choices and en-
actments relate to individual employees’ control legitimacy perceptions, 
and whether such perceptions affect subsequent compliance intentions 
in the specific context of ISD projects. Clarifying these relationships is an 
important step towards advancing the field’s understanding of IS control 
use in organizations. In particular, by reflecting on what motivates 
employees and what shapes their attitudes about the organizations in 
which they work (e.g., [23, 39]), we can gain rich insights into their 
behaviors that can be leveraged by managers in terms of how control 
legitimacy can impact compliance (e.g., [6, 18, 54]). These consider-
ations have the potential to influence how managers can more 
Table 6 
Results of the Linear Mixed Model Analysis (Compliance Intentions), only sig. 
CV included   
Compliance Intentions 
Est. t Sig. 95% CI 
Intercept 3.13 16.78 .000 2.75; 3.51 
[legitimacy-fairness] .30 10.92 .000 .24; .35 
[legitimacy-autonomy] .17 6.6 .000 .12; .22 
[legitimacy-groupIdentification] .01 .40 .690 -.05; .07 
[legitimacy-competenceDev.] .03 .85 .393 -.04; .09 
[work_experience=0-10 years] -.15 -2.12 .034 -.29; -.01 
[work_experience>10 years]      
N=2064, AIC=7617.22 
Covariance: Residual=2.27 [Sig. .000] 
[Subject=Organization] Intercept=.46 [Sig. .007]  
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effectively design and implement IS controls in their organizations, but 
to do so, we first require a more robust understanding of the relevant 
relationships. We acknowledge that the current study does not resolve 
all the questions associated with IS control legitimacy, but the discussion 
below aims to work towards an expanded understanding of the most 
pertinent issues. 
Drawing on the main factorial survey (vignette study) with 258 
participants, our data analysis results largely confirm the hypothesized 
effects of control modes, degree, and style on control legitimacy per-
ceptions. Specifically, we find that informal control modes, a relaxed 
control degree, and a bilateral control style are perceived as more 
legitimate by controllees than formal control modes, a tight control 
degree and a unilateral style, respectively. While these effects apply to 
all four considered legitimacy perceptions including fairness, autonomy, 
group identification, and competence development, our study results 
only offer empirical support that greater legitimacy perceptions 
regarding autonomy and fairness translate into higher control compli-
ance intentions among IS developers. In addition, our results show that 
ISD project team members’ individual backgrounds, as well as project 
characteristics, can influence legitimacy perceptions and compliance 
intentions. Taken together, the current study stresses the importance of 
both control choices and control enactments in shaping IS developers’ 
control legitimacy perceptions, as well as play the central role that such 
perceptions play in driving control compliance. 
Our study contributes to the IS (project) control literature in several 
ways. The first contribution lies in our focus on individual controllee 
perceptions nested in different organizations, which has been over-
looked in much of past research. Informed by prior qualitative case 
study-based research (e.g. [19]), we conducted a large-scale factorial 
survey (vignette study) that was developed based on extensive 
pre-testing and a pilot study. In doing so, we could quantitatively test IS 
developers’ control perceptions and compliance intentions at the indi-
vidual level and across different organizations. Understanding how 
managers’ control choices and control enactments affect individual 
perceptions is important since the effectiveness of controls largely de-
pends on the involved employees’ willingness to ‘support’ those con-
trols. Here, we find that apart from managerial control tactics, 
controllees’ perceptions of control legitimacy also depend on individual 
controllee characteristics, as well as on the organization at a higher level 
of analysis. In this regard, prior research has already pointed to the in-
fluence of project sourcing types, such as internal [92] and outsourced 
ISD [13] as well as the project size [34]. Also, Cram and Wiener [19] 
suggested that organizational culture characteristics could play an 
important role for control perceptions. Related considerations have been 
raised in past research in the context of perceptual congruence [63] and 
evaluational congruence [96], which refer to the controller-controllee 
agreement on the appropriateness of enacted controls. Still, legitimacy 
is distinct in that it originates as a micro-level, individual controllee 
construct that stems from independent perceptions and judgments [8]. 
As part of this study, we also identified some aspects related to em-
ployees’ individual backgrounds that appear to influence their legiti-
macy perceptions and therefore should be considered in more depth 
within future studies. For example, we found a negative link between 
employees’ levels of work experience and their legitimacy perceptions 
regarding group identification and competence development. One 
possible explanation is that less experienced employees perceive con-
trols as not working towards cooperation, participative decision making, 
and skills development. In these cases, forcing controls might even lead 
to negative emotional responses by controllees, such as frustration or 
demotivation as observed by Gregory and Keil [30]. Moreover, our data 
showed that IS developers who are experienced with agile development 
display considerably lower control legitimacy perceptions (along three 
dimensions) compared to developers who are used to waterfall or hybrid 
development approaches. This observation may be explained by the fact 
that agile methodologies arguably encourage reduced use of traditional, 
formal controls (e.g., documented project plans), in favor of self-directed 
teams and project flexibility [59]. As such, IS developers who work on 
agile projects may not see the need for strict formal controls, resulting in 
lower control legitimacy perceptions. Nevertheless, it might be a fallacy 
to conclude that in agile settings control is not appropriate or needed. A 
secondary analysis of 21 IS project control case studies conducted by 
Remus et al. [76] has shown that control often serves value-creation and 
coordination purposes, which is particularly crucial in agile settings. 
Still, our results suggest that if managers want to enact control in project 
teams that are usually not used to extensive formal controls, they are 
particularly well advised to choose rather informal control and enact it 
in a bilateral way, thereby maintaining a sufficient level of autonomy for 
project team members. 
Finally, our linear mixed model analyses also revealed that the or-
ganization as a random factor explained some variability in the em-
ployees’ legitimacy perceptions and compliance intentions. Based on 
our data, we could not identify any organization-related patterns; 
however, taking organizational factors apart from vignette-related and 
employee-related factors, into account has the potential to deepen our 
understanding of what shapes employees’ legitimacy perceptions and 
compliance intentions. 
Our second research question investigates the importance of sub-
ordinates’ control legitimacy perceptions in terms of their effects on the 
intentions to comply with controls. In the IS security policy literature, 
several studies exist that find a link between legitimacy perceptions in 
general and compliance intentions (e.g., [6, 37, 86]). However, at this 
juncture, we are not aware of any IS studies that have empirically 
analyzed this link and shed light on the importance of different control 
legitimacy aspects for compliance intentions in the specific context of 
ISD projects. Our findings show a pronounced positive effect of 
perceived control fairness, which is almost twice as strong as the effect 
of perceived autonomy. Relatedly, our post-hoc mediation analysis 
corroborated these findings by showing that perceived fairness and 
autonomy are partially mediating the effects of all covered control 
choices (modes, degrees) and control enactments (styles) on compliance 
intentions. Thus, we suggest that future research on the behavioral 
consequences of ISD control activities should focus on these two legiti-
macy dimensions and their role in maximizing employees’ intentions to 
comply with controls. Generally, this assertion is supported by Wiener 
et al. [96] who conclude that managers can increase the performance of 
IS projects by increasing perceptions of control appropriateness among 
controllees instead of just adding more controls. In respect of the other 
two sources of legitimacy, the results of our study suggested that neither 
perceived group identification nor competence development has an 
impact on compliance intentions. In sum, from a control-compliance 
perspective, fairness and autonomy appear to be the most important 
legitimacy dimensions to consider when choosing and enacting controls. 
In this regard, however, we would like to emphasize the need for further 
research on the viability of attaching learning and skills development to 
the exercise of control. 
Apart from control choices and enactments, the survey respondents’ 
individual background also played a relevant role, as work experience 
became a relevant explanatory variable for compliance intentions (i.e., 
IS developers with more work experience reported higher intentions to 
comply with controls). One explanation for this link could be that more 
experienced (and typically older) employees are more likely to hold 
management positions in organizations, thus also seeing the need for 
control. Consequently, an effective means for increasing individual 
compliance could be to better communicate the underlying reasons for 
specific controls to controllees. Also, our results showed that compliance 
intentions differed among the 19 different organizations under 
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investigation, opening room for further research. 
Regarding control choices and enactments, our study results show 
that overall, from the employee perspective, the most legitimate control 
configuration is informal control with a relaxed control degree that is 
implemented in a bilateral way. While each of these control aspects 
shows significant positive effects on all four considered legitimacy di-
mensions (considered in separate models), the fairness dimension has 
the strongest impact on compliance intentions, followed by autonomy. 
This indicates that if managers want to increase their employees’ 
compliance with controls, they are well advised to implement controls 
that are perceived as fair and allowing for sufficient autonomy at work. 
As noted above, one possible way to achieve this is to focus on informal 
controls, a relaxed degree, and a bilateral control style. Future inquiries 
on this topic could continue to investigate and compare different control 
configurations and enactments, to guide managers towards the control 
decisions that can maximize legitimacy, as well as employee compliance 
intentions. 
As a second major contribution, we extend existing IS control 
research by focusing not only on control modes but also taking control 
degrees and styles into account. Our quantitative analysis confirms the 
assumed links between managers’ control choices (covering control 
modes and degrees) and enactments (covering control styles), and 
resulting legitimacy perceptions of controllees. This is in line with 
Gregory et al. [29] who point to the need to find the appropriate com-
bination of modes, degree, and style when implementing control 
(referred to as control balancing). In this study, we conceptualized 
legitimacy around the four sources proposed by Bijlsma-Frankema and 
Costa [7]: fairness, autonomy, group identification, and competence 
development. Regarding control modes, informal control, in general, 
was perceived to be more legitimate than formal control (H1). This is 
consistent with previous findings by Cram and Wiener [19], and also by 
Jaworski et al. [41], who offer empirical evidence that informal control 
modes are more effective in increasing employee job satisfaction than 
formal modes. Remus et al. [75] presented few explanations for this 
phenomenon; they noted that informal controls provide higher levels of 
autonomy and flexibility (which represents one focal dimension of 
control legitimacy). Moreover, informal control facilitates quick conflict 
resolution through social cohesion [14], which is related to our third 
dimension of control legitimacy (group identification). 
From a practical perspective, our results therefore suggest that 
whenever managers can choose from a set of comparable formal and 
informal controls for IS developers, they should opt for the informal 
controls, since they would be more likely perceived as legitimate. The 
results of our study also point to the use of a relaxed control degree (H2) 
and a bilateral control style (H3) as additional and important managerial 
control choices that could positively impact controllees’ legitimacy 
perceptions of enacted controls. This advice should apply not only to 
controls that are being newly designed and implemented, but also for 
the fine-tuning of existing controls. However, we recognize that some 
managers may face opposition when attempting to implement informal 
controls due to guidelines imposed by regulatory bodies, organizational 
culture norms, or executive preferences. In such cases, managers should 
use their judgment to find a balance between controls that can maximize 
developer legitimacy, while also meeting other stakeholder re-
quirements. Since our mediation analysis showed that only two control 
legitimacy sources (autonomy and fairness) partially mediate effects on 
compliance intentions, future research should focus on those effects to 
investigate under which conditions of informal control choices with a 
relaxed degree and enacted in a bilateral style can be more effective than 
implementing additional controls representing alternative control 
choices and enactments. 
Related studies have reported that control resistance is of particular 
concern to ISD practice. For example, Murungi et al. [62] suggested 
that the use of a unilateral control style results in negative behavioral 
responses in terms of active or passive resistance. Our findings imply 
that such resistance behavior can be explained by control legitimacy. 
Similarly, Heumann et al. [34] found that legitimacy concerns, among 
other factors, might motivate managers’ choices to use a bilateral 
control style. In this regard, our study extended the studies by Heu-
mann et al. [34], Cram and Wiener [19], and Murungi et al. [62] by 
offering insights on the relative importance of the links between con-
trol modes, degrees, and styles and different sources of perceived 
legitimacy (in quantitative terms), which in turn contributes to a more 
nuanced understanding of how control can, or should, be exercised 
[34]. In particular, our study suggests that control modes and styles 
have the strongest impact on controllees’ legitimacy perceptions, 
which implies that managers need to carefully consider these two 
control aspects. Further, while the effects of different control degrees 
were generally weaker, they were still significant. More specifically, 
and contrary to Cram and Wiener [19] who observed inconsistent ef-
fects of control degree on legitimacy perceptions, we observed 
consistent effects in our vignette study, meaning that a relaxed control 
degree was always associated with higher legitimacy perceptions in all 
four of the mixed models we analyzed. 
6.1. Limitations and future research 
The results and contributions of the current study should be inter-
preted with some limitations in mind, which also present promising 
opportunities for future research. First, for the vignette study, we had to 
prepare simplified descriptions of control situations as they may occur in 
real-life ISD projects. Although we put considerable effort in formu-
lating, testing, and refining the vignettes in order to ensure that they 
accurately represent the considered control concepts, some of the study 
participants might still have misinterpreted them. In order to keep the 
length of the survey manageable and thus avoid biasing fatigue effects, 
we decided not to repeat our inter-rater reliability tests in the survey 
process. 
Second, we deliberately placed the focus of our study on an early stage 
and average-sized and complex ISD project in a non-critical situation and 
provided background information on this setting in the survey process at 
the start of each vignette description. The aim of this information was to 
avoid different interpretations of control requirements. Still, our 
multilevel analysis indicates that the assessments of controllees’ legiti-
macy perceptions and compliance intentions depend on the hosting or-
ganization. As well, we find that controllees’ individual backgrounds 
and experiences influence legitimacy perceptions and compliance in-
tentions, which can also be expected to change along the project course 
and may deviate for ‘challenged’ ISD projects (e.g., projects not pro-
ceeding according to plan and/or exceeding budgeted costs). Thus, a 
promising avenue for future research could be to explore and identify in 
more detail how organizational-level factors, as well as the project 
context and status, affect legitimacy perceptions and compliance in-
tentions based on control choices and enactments. 
Third, in our study, we measured controllees’ compliance intentions. 
Although we asked study participants about their level of understand-
ing/empathy for the vignette protagonist’s non-compliance with the 
controls as a means to reduce social desirability bias, actual behaviors 
might still deviate from intentions. Such deviations may be associated 
with a participant’s expectations for the likelihood and severity of 
sanctions for non-compliance. Thus, an interesting opportunity for 
further research would be to measure participants’ actual compliance 
with enacted controls, as well as their expectations for punishment 
where controls are not adhered to. In this regard, a field experiment 
could be a promising approach to measure how subordinates will 
behave. 
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Finally, not all statistical assumptions of linear mixed models were 
met in this study. Although many researchers argue that robust models 
can also be created if the distributional assumptions of linear models are 
violated, we could not exclude the possibility of biases. While our sta-
tistical tests support most of the hypothesized relationships, the direct 
effects of control modes, degrees, and styles indicate the possibility of 
additional factors besides legitimacy that mediate their effects on 
compliance intentions, which points to another promising avenue for 
future research. 
7. Conclusion 
ISD projects are continuing to fail at an alarmingly high rate, sug-
gesting that project controls are often not configured and enacted 
effectively. Against this backdrop, the overarching goal of this study 
was to shed light on the impact of different control choices (in terms of 
modes and degrees) and enactments (in terms of styles) on individual 
legitimacy perceptions of IS developers and ultimately on their 
compliance intentions. To achieve this goal, we conducted a factorial 
survey (vignette study) with 258 developers from Austria and Ger-
many and created linear mixed models to analyze our data sample and 
test our research model. The study results provided empirical support 
for most of the hypothesized relationships. In particular, they sug-
gested that informal control modes, a relaxed control degree, and a 
bilateral control style are significantly associated with high percep-
tions of control legitimacy. More precisely, our results suggest that 
legitimacy perceptions are primarily a function of the selected control 
modes and control style and to a lesser extent a function of the 
employed control degree. 
Overall, this research offers valuable empirical support for a direct, 
significantly positive relationship between control legitimacy percep-
tions and compliance intentions. In conclusion, the study results 
contribute to the steadily growing body of research on the antecedents 
and consequences of control legitimacy perceptions and provide ISD 
managers with guidance on how to configure and enact controls that 
are perceived by ISD project team members as being ‘legit.’ 
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Appendix A. Overview of related literature 
Table A.1 
Table A.1 
Overview of Related Literature  
Reference* Context Controller/ 
Controllee 
Orientation 
Variables & 
Relationships of 
Interest 
Choudhury 
& 
Sabherwal 
[13] 
Examines the 
factors that 
influence the 
controls within 
five outsourced 
Focused primarily 
on the controller, as 
well as the portfolio 
of controls in place 
Considers control 
modes, as well as the 
factors that influence 
the choice of modes  
Table A.1 (continued ) 
Reference* Context Controller/ 
Controllee 
Orientation 
Variables & 
Relationships of 
Interest 
systems 
development 
projects 
Chua et al.  
[14] 
Examines how 
clan controls are 
used in complex IT 
projects 
Primarily oriented 
around the 
controller role in 
enacting clan 
control 
Focuses on the clan 
control mode in 
terms of how it builds 
and leverages teams 
Cram & 
Wiener  
[19] 
Considers how 
control activities 
impact a 
controllee’s 
perspective of 
control legitimacy 
Controllee-oriented 
perspective only 
Links between 
control activities 
(modes, degree, 
style) and control 
legitimacy 
Gopal & 
Gosain  
[28] 
Considers the 
context of 
outsourced 
software projects 
based in India 
Focused on the 
controller (project 
manager) 
perspective 
Focuses on the 
implications of 
control mode choice 
(process, outcome, 
clan) on performance 
(software quality, 
project efficiency) 
Gregory et al. 
[29] 
Oriented around 
the control 
dynamics within 
ISD outsourcing 
projects 
Focused on the 
controller-driven 
configuration 
adjustments 
(control balancing) 
that are undertaken 
during projects 
Considers control 
types, degrees, and 
styles 
Henderson & 
Lee [32] 
Examines how 
control effects the 
performance of an 
(internal) IS 
project team 
Draws on the 
perspective of both 
controllers (e.g., 
project managers) 
and controllees (e. 
g., IS designers) 
Considers the link 
between formal 
control modes 
(behavior, outcome) 
and team 
performance 
Heumann 
et al. [34] 
Examines an IS 
project control at 
a large 
engineering firm 
across multiple 
hierarchical levels 
Considers both 
controllers (e.g., 
senior 
management) and 
controllees (e.g., 
project team 
members) 
Considers formal 
control modes 
(outcome, behavior) 
and styles 
Kirsch et al.  
[49] 
Examines the 
factors that are 
associated with 
control mode 
choices in IS 
projects 
Considers the 
perspective of 
controllers from 
both IS project 
leadership and 
client leadership 
Examines how 
behavior 
observability and 
outcome 
measurability relate 
to the use of control 
modes (behavior, 
outcome, clan, and 
self) 
Kirsch [48] Considers how 
stakeholders 
exercise control 
during different 
phases of systems 
projects that are 
deployed globally 
Focuses on 
organizational 
stakeholder 
controllers, such as 
CIOs, senior IS 
managers, and 
systems 
development 
managers 
Examines both 
formal and informal 
control mechanisms 
during requirements 
gathering, 
development and 
implementation 
phases. 
Rustagi et al. 
[81] 
Examines the 
antecedents to the 
amount of formal 
control that a 
client exercises 
over a vendor in IT 
outsourcing 
partnerships 
Focuses on client 
and vendor 
controllers 
Considers the links 
between task 
characteristics, client 
knowledge, and the 
amount of formal 
control 
* - The ten studies listed in this table do not represent an exhaustive list of all IS 
project control research, but were selected as representative examples that have 
been frequently cited in the literature. 
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Appendix B. Vignettes 
Table B.1 
Table B.1 
Vignette Universe  
Overview Vignette Text 
Background Information (Shown at 
the beginning of each vignette) 
Background (constant across all situations): 
Bob is a programmer in a bank. Currently, he is 
working on an internal project to develop some 
new features for a software application used at 
the bank. The project is of typical size and 
complexity for the organization and was 
started a few weeks ago. As of now, the project 
is proceeding according to the specified scope, 
cost, and time plans. 
ID 1 Vignette Set 1: Behavior 
Control Relaxed, Bilateral 
Before the project was started, all the 
programmers had agreed with the project 
manager to program in pairs. Those pairs 
involved one employee programming and 
another employee reviewing the code. The 
pairing assignments were determined by 
mutual consent of the programmers and the 
project manager. However, upon consultation 
with the project manager, the programmers 
were permitted to change their programming 
partners under certain circumstances and were 
not required to keep a log of the role 
assignment. For example, if a programmer’s 
partner was not available, they were also 
allowed to program alone. 
However, yesterday Bob decided to program 
alone although his programming partner was 
available. 
ID 2 Vignette Set 2: Behavior 
Control, Tight, Bilateral 
Before the project was started, all the 
programmers had agreed with the project 
manager to always program in pairs. Those 
pairs involved one employee programming 
and another employee reviewing the code. The 
programming partners were determined by 
mutual consent of the programmers and the 
project manager. However, only in clearly 
justified cases and upon consultation with the 
project manager, the programmers were 
allowed to change their programming 
partners. The role assignment had to be 
tracked in a Word document. However, 
yesterday Bob decided to program alone 
although his programming partner was 
available. 
ID 3 Vignette Set 1: Behavior 
Control, Relaxed, Unilateral 
Shortly after the project had been started, the 
project manager instructed the programmers 
to program in pairs. Those pairs involved one 
employee programming and another employee 
reviewing the code. The project manager 
decided on the programming partners 
throughout the project. If sometimes the 
programming partner was not available, they 
were permitted to program alone. The 
programmers were not required to keep a log 
of the role assignment over time. However, 
yesterday Bob decided to program alone 
although his programming partner was 
available. 
ID 4 Vignette Set 2: Behavior 
Control, Tight, Unilateral 
Shortly after the project had been started, the 
project manager instructed the programmers 
to always program in pairs. Those pairs 
involved one employee programming and 
another employee reviewing the code. The 
project manager decided on the programming 
partners and any potential amendments 
throughout the project. The role assignment 
had to be tracked in a Word document. 
However, yesterday Bob decided to program 
alone although his programming partner was 
available.  
Table B.1 (continued ) 
ID 5 Vignette Set 2: Outcome 
Control Relaxed, Bilateral 
Before the project was started, all the 
programmers had defined some phases and 
software delivery dates together with the 
project manager. At the end of each phase with 
a duration of approximately two months, the 
programmers agreed to submit their code to 
the project manager together with a brief 
report on their work progress. The 
programmers were also asked to submit their 
code in case of delays, and report known bugs 
and open issues to the project manager to 
improve software quality. The project manager 
then decided on further actions together with 
the programmer. Good work was awarded 
with a financial bonus, poor work and delays 
were sanctioned with a wage cut. Bob is aware 
of some minor bugs in the code he is about to 
submit at the end of the day. However, he 
plans to fix those bugs at a later date. He 
decides to not communicate the issues and 
keep them secret. 
ID 6 Vignette Set 1: Outcome 
Control, Tight, Bilateral 
Before the project was started, all the 
programmers had defined detailed phases and 
software delivery dates together with the 
project manager. At the end of each phase with 
a duration of approximately one week, the 
programmers agreed to submit their code to 
the project manager together with a detailed 
report on their work progress. The 
programmers were also asked to submit 
incomplete software increments in case of 
delays, and report known bugs and open issues 
to the project manager to improve software 
quality. In the event of delays or known bugs, 
the programmers were required to fill in a form 
to provide more information about those open 
issues. Moreover, the programmers had to 
submit concrete suggestions for fixing the 
issues and/or to regain time when delivering 
the respective software increment. The project 
manager then decided on further actions 
together with the programmer. Good work was 
awarded with a financial bonus, poor work and 
delays were sanctioned with a wage cut. Bob is 
aware of some minor bugs in the code he is 
about to submit at the end of the day. 
However, he plans to fix those bugs at a later 
date. He decides to not communicate the issues 
and keep them secret. 
ID 7 Vignette Set 2: Outcome 
Control, Relaxed, Unilateral 
Shortly after the project had been started, the 
project manager defined some phases and 
software delivery dates. At the end of each 
phase with a duration of approximately two 
months, the programmers had to submit their 
code to the project manager together with a 
brief report on their work progress. The 
programmers were also asked to submit 
incomplete software increments in case of 
delays, and report known bugs and open issues 
to the project manager to improve software 
quality. Based on this information, the project 
manager then decided on the further strategy 
to get back on track. Good work was awarded 
with a financial bonus, poor work and delays 
were sanctioned with a wage cut. Bob is aware 
of some minor bugs in the code he is about to 
submit at the end of the day. However, he 
plans to fix those bugs at a later date. He 
decides to not communicate the issues and 
keep them secret. 
ID 8 Vignette Set 1: Outcome 
Control, Tight, Unilateral 
Shortly after the project had been started, the 
project manager defined detailed phases and 
software delivery dates. At the end of each 
phase with a duration of approximately one 
week, the programmers had to submit their 
code to the project manager together with a 
detailed report on their work progress. The 
programmers were also asked to submit 
incomplete software increments in case of 
(continued on next page) 
R. Walser et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Information & Management 58 (2021) 103522
13
Table B.1 (continued ) 
delays, and report known bugs and open issues 
to the project manager to improve software 
quality. In the event of delays or known bugs, 
the programmers were required to fill in a form 
to provide more information about those open 
issues. Moreover, the programmers had to 
submit concrete suggestions for fixing the 
issues and/or to regain time when delivering 
the respective software increment. Based on 
this information, the project manager decided 
on the further strategy to get back on track. 
Good work was awarded with a financial 
bonus, poor work and delays were sanctioned 
with a wage cut. Bob is aware of some minor 
bugs in the code he is about to submit at the 
end of the day. However, he plans to fix those 
bugs at a later date. He decides to not 
communicate the issues and keep them secret. 
ID 9 Vignette Set 2: Clan Control 
Relaxed, Bilateral 
Before the project was started, all the 
programmers together with the project 
manager had agreed on blocking every first 
Friday afternoon of the month for some joint 
social activities such as a barbeque outside the 
office or some bowling. This should allow 
colleagues not only to socially bond but also to 
provide an informal space to exchange any 
project related topics. During these events 
programmers would be asked to reflect on 
their own monthly experiences. Employees 
who were absent were not penalized. Bob 
decided to only rarely attend those events and 
instead informs the project manager that he 
needs the time to complete his work although 
this is not the case. 
ID 10 Vignette Set 1: Clan Control, 
Tight, Bilateral 
Before the project was started, all the 
programmers together with the project 
manager had agreed on blocking every Friday 
afternoon for some joint social activities such 
as a barbeque outside the office or some 
bowling. This should allow colleagues not only 
to socially bond but also to provide an informal 
space to exchange any project related 
experiences. During these mandatory events 
programmers would be asked to report their 
own weekly performance. Attending those 
weekly team events was mandatory. Bob 
decided to only rarely attend those events and 
instead informs the project manager that he 
needs the time to complete his work although 
this is not the case. 
ID 11 Vignette Set 2: Clan Control, 
Relaxed, Unilateral 
Shortly after the project had been started, the 
project manager instructed the programmers 
to start blocking every last Friday afternoon of 
the month for some joint social activities such 
as a barbeque outside the office or some 
bowling. This should allow colleagues not only 
to socially bond but also to provide an informal 
space to exchange any project related topics. 
During these events programmers would be 
asked to reflect on their own monthly 
experiences. Employees who were absent were 
not penalized. Bob decided to only rarely 
attend those events and instead informs the 
project manager that he needs the time to 
complete his work although this is not the case. 
ID 12 Vignette Set 1: Clan Control, 
Tight, Unilateral 
Shortly after the project had been started, the 
project manager instructed the programmers 
to start blocking every Friday afternoon for 
some joint social activities such as a barbeque 
outside the office or some bowling. This should 
allow colleagues not only to socially bond but 
also to provide an informal space to exchange 
any project related experiences. During these 
mandatory events programmers would be 
asked to report their own weekly performance. 
Attending those weekly team events was 
mandatory. Bob decided to only rarely attend 
those events and instead informs the project 
manager that he needs to the time to complete 
his work although is not case.  
Table B.1 (continued ) 
ID 13 Vignette Set 1: Self-Control 
Relaxed, Bilateral 
Before the project was started, all the 
programmers, together with the project 
manager, discussed potential ways to ensure 
that the upcoming programming activities 
create value for the organization. So, the 
programmers and the project manager 
discussed the requirements and divided the 
work packages among each other. Afterwards, 
the programmers were supposed to work 
independently on their respective work 
package and tracked their progress 
individually. Whenever the programmers felt 
the need to, they were free to consult the 
project manager to discuss their status, get 
feedback on their self-assessed performance 
and to think of ways for improvement. 
Although Bob soon recognizes that he is behind 
schedule, he decides to not consult the project 
manager to avoid unpleasant questions and 
negative feedback. 
ID 14 Vignette Set 2: Self-Control, 
Tight, Bilateral 
Before the project was started, all the 
programmers, together with the project 
manager, discussed potential ways to ensure 
that the upcoming programming activities 
create value for the organization. So, the 
programmers and the project manager 
discussed the requirements and divided the 
work packages among each other. Afterwards, 
the programmers were supposed to work 
independently on their respective work 
package and track their progress individually. 
The project team agreed that each programmer 
should define some individual key 
performance criteria in written form. 
Afterwards, there should be at least one 
mandatory weekly consultation with the 
project manager to discuss and evaluate each 
programmer’s self-assessed performance. Bob 
soon recognizes that he is behind schedule. 
However, during one of his weekly mandatory 
conversations with the project manager, Bob 
decides not to mention the delay to avoid 
unpleasant feedback. 
ID 15 Vignette Set 1: Self-Control, 
Relaxed, Unilateral 
Shortly after the project had been started, the 
project manager formed work packages and 
assigned them to the programmers. This way, 
the project manager wanted to ensure that the 
upcoming programming activities create value 
for the organization. The programmers were 
supposed to work independently on their 
assigned work package and track their progress 
individually. Whenever the programmers felt 
the need to, they were allowed to consult the 
project manager to discuss their status, get 
feedback on their self-assessed performance 
and to obtain ways for improvement. Although 
Bob soon recognizes that he is behind 
schedule, he decides to not consult the project 
manager to avoid unpleasant questions and 
negative feedback. 
ID 16 Vignette Set 2: Self-Control, 
Tight, Unilateral 
Shortly after the project had been started, the 
project manager formed work packages and 
assigned them to the programmers. This way 
he wanted to ensure that the upcoming 
programming activities create value for the 
organization. The programmers were supposed 
to work independently on their assigned work 
package and track their progress individually. 
Each programmer was instructed to define 
some individual key performance criteria in 
written form. The project manager wanted to 
have at least one mandatory weekly 
consultation with each programmer to discuss 
and evaluate their self-assessed performance. 
Bob soon recognizes that he is behind 
schedule. However, during one of his weekly 
mandatory conversations with the project 
manager Bob decides to not mention his delay 
to avoid unpleasant feedback.  
R. Walser et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Information & Management 58 (2021) 103522
14
Appendix C. Survey questions 
From the perspective of Bob, how would you rate the above-described control (i.e., the manager’s guidelines around work package distribution and 
feedback) and its enactment in terms of the following aspects?    
1(no, 2 3 4 5 6 7 (yes,  
not at all)      absolutely) 
Is fair. O O O O O O O 
Maintains work autonomy. O O O O O O O 
Enables team cooperation O O O O O O O 
Facilitates competence development. O O O O O O O  
As noted above, Bob decided to not comply with the control. If you were in the above-described situation, how likely is it that you would behave 
like Bob and not comply with the control as well?    
1(very, 2 3 4 5 6 7 (very,  
unlikely)      likely)  
O O O O O O O  
Appendix D. Multilevel mediation analysis 
TableD.1 
Appendix E. Correlation analysis 
Table E.1 
Table D.1 
Multilevel Mediation of Compliance Intentions With Two Lower-Level Mediators  
Within-Direct Effects on Compliance Intentions 
Lower-Level Predictors Estimate Standard Error t p 95% CI 
Control Mode .318*** .072 4.422 0.000 [.277, .459] 
Control Degree .134* .067 1.990 0.047 [.002, .266] 
Control Style .390*** .070 5.533 0.000 [.252, .528] 
Within-Indirect Effects via Control Mode      
Mediators Estimate Standard Error Z p 95%CI 
Fairness .348*** .037 9.462 0.000 [.278, .423] 
Autonomy .217*** .039 5.623 0.000 [.142, .294] 
Within-Indirect Effects via Control Degree      
Mediators Estimate Standard Error Z p 95% CI 
Fairness .162*** .029 5.63 0.000 [.108, .221] 
Autonomy .104*** .021 5.07 0.000 [.067, .148] 
Within-Indirect Effects via Control Style      
Mediators Estimate Standard Error Z p 95% CI 
Fairness .369*** .040 9.332 0.000 [.295, .449] 
Autonomy .167*** .027 6.165 0.000 [.115, .223] 
Notes: Responses clustered by organizations (level 1); all other variables are individual-level factors (level 2); CI = Confidence interval; Monte Carlo samples: 10,000; * p < .05, ** p <
.01, *** p < .001; two-tailed test  
Table E.1 
Correlation Matrix   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(1) Fairness 1 .72*** .68*** .66*** .43*** 
(2) Autonomy  1 .64*** .60*** .39*** 
(3) Competence Development   1 .77*** .27*** 
(4) Group Identification    1 .29*** 
(5) Compliance Intentions     1 
Notes: Pearson Correlation, *** p < .001 
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